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The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq
William D. Nordhaus1
November 14, 2002

Armed with strong resolutions from the U.S. Congress and the U.N.
Security Council, the United States is marching toward war with Iraq. The
October 2002 Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of force
describes U.S. policy, “to defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”2 In early November
of 2002, the unanimous Security Council Resolution “warned Iraq that it
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations…”3
The major benefits of a war are reckoned to be disarming Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction and removing a leadership that is
unrelentingly hostile to the United States. But what of the costs? Even
asking such a question may be thought a sign of insufficient resolve at best
and appeasement at worst. However, while cost estimates are often ignored
when war is debated, most people recognize that the costs in dollars, and
especially in blood, are acceptable only as long as they are low. If the
casualty estimates mount to the thousands, if oil prices skyrocket, if a war
pushes the economy into recession or requires a large tax increase, and if
the United States becomes a pariah in the world because of callous attacks
on civilian populations, then decision makers in the White House and the
Congress might not post so expeditiously to battle.

The author is grateful for helpful comments from Hill Huntington, Carl Kaysen, Joseph
LaPalombara, Paul MacAvoy, Martin Malin, Doug Rae, Gustav Ranis, Bruce Russett,
Herbert Scarf, Martin Shubik, Robert Silvers, John Weyant, John White, and anonymous
readers from the Bush Administration. A non-technical version of this essay was
published in The New York Review of Books, December 5, 2002 and is available at
http://www.nybooks.com/.
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H.J.Res.114 (October 2002).
Resolution 1441 at Security Council meeting 4644, 8 November 2002.
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Given the salience of cost, it is surprising that there have been no
systematic public analyses of the economics of a military conflict in Iraq.
This essay attempts to fill the gap. It is recognized that the estimates here
are virtually certain to be wrong, for the fog of war extends far beyond the
battlefield to include forecasts of political reactions and economic
consequences.
However, as Keynes said, it is better to be vaguely right than
precisely wrong.
While historians have documented the many miscalculations
involved in war, little has been written on faulty economic forecasts, but a
couple of examples will suffice. Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury
estimated that the direct cost of the war to the North would be $240 million,
which amounted to about 7 percent of annual GDP at that time. The actual
cost to the North turned out to be $3,200 million, or about 13 times the
original estimated cost.4 The cost to the South was much greater, for most of
its capital stock was destroyed and output per worker was depressed for
nearly a century. The most prophetic economic analysis of war and peace of
all time, Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace, did not foresee the
great German inflation that was virtually at hand, nor did it contain any
hints of the coming Great Depressions in Britain of the 1920s or of the
world of the 1930s.
In recent times, the costs of the Vietnam War were grossly
underestimated even as the buildup occurred. The original budget
projection in early 1966 underestimated the cost for the subsequent fiscal
year by $10 billion, or about 1½ percent of GDP. In assuming that the war
would end by June 1967, the Pentagon underestimated the total cost of the
war by around 90 percent. The war in fact dragged on until 1973, and the
total direct cost was in the range of $110 billion to $150 billion.5 The indirect
costs were more difficult to gauge but comprised inflation and economic
instability, civil unrest, and, some have argued, a growing disenchantment
with authority and government in the United States.

4

See Table 2 below.

The economic story is thoughtfully laid out in Arthur Okun, The Political Economy of
Prosperity, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1970, Chapter 3.
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Estimating the Costs of War
The Economic Background in Iraq
It is widely recognized that the United States is an economic and
military superpower. The military status of Iraq has been carefully
reviewed,6 and I will concentrate on the current economic situation,
beginning with Iraq’s major economic asset, oil.
Oil experts believe that Iraq has immense oil resources. Iraq has
about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and resources. A review
in early 2002 by the U.S. Energy Information Agency stated:
Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the second largest in the
world (behind Saudi Arabia) along with roughly 220 billion barrels of probable
and possible resources. Iraq’s true resource potential may be far greater than this,
however, as the country is relatively unexplored due to years of war and
sanctions. Deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert
region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources, but have not been
explored.7

Iraq’s oil resources could satisfy current U.S. oil imports for almost a
century.
Iraq’s oil production in 2000 and 2001 averaged around 2.5 million
barrels per day (mbpd). About 1 mbpd of this came from the northern
Kirkuk field located largely in Kurdish Iraq, and the balance was produced
largely in the southern, Shiite-majority Rumaila region.
What is the current state of Iraq’s economy? The regime of Saddam
Hussein has been as disastrous for the Iraqi economy as for other aspects of
Iraqi society. Iraq’s statistical system, like much of its economy, is in a sad
state. None of the major international organizations has provided reliable
data on Iraq’s economy for the last decade, but a rough estimate of
economic conditions can be obtained on the basis of informal estimates.

See particularly Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic
Net Assessment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, September
2002.
6
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http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html
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In recent decades, Iraq has been heavily dependent upon oil
production. During those periods when oil production was not constrained
by war or sanctions, it peaked at around 3 million barrels per day, or about
1 billion barrels per year. This constituted about half of Iraq’s GDP during
the late 1970s. GDP per capita peaked in 1979 at around $9000 in 2002
prices.
The year 1979 also marked Saddam Hussein’s rise to power. Since
that time, Iraq has experienced one of the most catastrophic economic
declines in modern history. It appears that per capita income was in the
range of $1000 - $1200 in 2001. These figures suggest that in the 23 years
since Saddam came to power, living standards in Iraq’s economy have
declined by around 90 percent.
The first phase of the economic decline came during the Iran-Iraq
war (1980-88), and second during the first Persian Gulf War and under the
subsequent UN sanctions. The Iran-Iraq war dealt a devastating blow to the
Iraqi economy. The war destroyed a large part of Iraq’s capital stock,
reduced oil production and exports, and depleted much of its foreign assets
and foreign exchange reserves. Kamran Mofid estimated that the total cost
to Iraq was $450 billion (in current dollars), which amounts to about eight
years of Iraq’s GDP at that time.8
The First Persian Gulf War (PGW-I) and the ensuing sanctions dealt
two more blows to Iraq’s economy. The war destroyed about $230 billion of
infrastructure.9 The UN sanctions in place since 1991 have been the most
severe ever imposed. Under sanctions, oil production during the 1991-2002
period averaged 1.4 mbpd. Assuming that Iraq could have produced 3
mbpd during this period, the revenue shortfall since PGW-I was about $150
billion. Although reliable statistics on Iraqi GDP are unavailable, it
probably averaged $25 billion in the 1990s. This suggests that the sanctions
reduced Iraq’s oil revenues by approximately six years’ GDP, and the total
cost to the Iraqi economy was probably even larger than that. Overall, the
wars and sanctions during the Saddam regime probably cost Iraq in the
order of two decades of GDP in lost output, capital, and financial resources.
There are no parallels in modern history to economic devastation on that
scale.

8

Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, Routledge, London, 1990.

9

Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT., 1994.
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Economic statistics are too abstract to capture the grim reality on the
ground. A recent report captures the impact of economic decline on day-today life.
While the accuracy of statistics demonstrating the impact of United Nations
sanctions on Iraq cannot be fully determined, there is no question that their impact
has been severe. Infant mortality has doubled from the pre-sanctions era, with the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reporting a fivefold increase in mortality
among children under age five. Kwashiorkor and marasmus – symptoms of severe
protein deficiency and usually seen only in famines – are increasingly common….
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “The vast majority of the
country’s population has been on a semi-starvation diet for years.” An FAO Mission
to Iraq in the summer of 1997 found that 25 percent of young men and 16 percent of
young women show signs of chronic energy deficiency, reflecting the reduced
availability of food over the past seven years…. Before sanctions, 93 percent of urban
and 70 percent of rural residents had access to potable water. Currently more than
half of rural residents do not have access to clean water.10

The Costs of Wars Past
Before analyzing the current conflict, it will be useful to review the
costs of past major wars. Table 1 shows the size of forces and total fatalities
suffered by the United States in past wars.

Sheila Carapico, “The Impact of Sanctions in Iraq,” Middle East Report, Spring 1998,
vol. 28, no. 206, no. 1 (slightly edited for brevity), available at
http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/themes.html#hum.

10
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Conflict

Population
[millions]

Military Personnel
[thousands]

[% of
population]

Fatalities
[numbers]

[% of
Population]

Revolutionary War

3.5

200

5.7%

4,435

0.127%

War of 1812

7.6

286

3.8%

2,260

0.030%

Mexican War

21.1

79

0.4%

1,733

0.008%

26.2

2,803

10.7%

110,070

0.420%

8.1

1,064

13.1%

74,524

0.920%

34.3

3,868

11.1%

184,594

0.538%

74.6

307

0.4%

385

0.001%

World War I

102.8

4,744

4.6%

53,513

0.052%

World War II

133.5

16,354

12.2%

292,131

0.219%

Korean War

151.7

5,764

3.8%

33,651

0.022%

Vietnam War

204.9

8,744

4.3%

47,369

0.023%

First Persian Gulf War

260.0

2,750

1.1%

148

0.000%

Civil War
Union
Confederate
Combined

Spanish-American War

Table 1. American Casualties from Major American Wars
Source: Al Nofi, Statistical Summary: America’s Major Wars at
http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm, based on Principal Wars
in which the US Participated: US Military Personnel Serving and Casualties,
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and
Reports. US Department of Defense Records, Table 2-23. Casualties are limited to
U.S. military forces.

_____________________________________________________________
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Table 2 provides estimates of the direct military costs to the United
States of major wars (again, statistics on losses to adversaries are not
available). These costs omit veterans’ benefits and health costs, which are
appropriate budgetary items and have sometimes added substantially to
costs but are difficult to reckon. They also omit interest costs, which are not
appropriate economic costs as they reflect decisions about financing rather
than costs. Major wars in the past cost more than one-half of a year’s GDP.
By contrast, the first Persian Gulf War cost only about 1 percent of GDP.

Conflict

Total Direct
Costs of Wars
(billions)

[Current $]
Revolutionary Wars (1775-1783)

Total Direct
Costs of Wars
(billions)

[2002 $]

Per
capita
cost

Cost

[2002 $]

[% of
annual
GDP]

0.1

2.2

447

63

War of 1812 (1812-1815)

0.09

1.1

120

13

Mexican War (1846-1848)

0.07

1.6

68

3

Union

3.2

38.1

1,357

84

Confederate

2.0

23.8

2,749

169

Combined

5.2

62.0

1,686

104

0.4

9.6

110

3

World War I (1917-1918)

16.8

190.6

2,489

24

World War II (1941-1945)

285.4

2,896.3

20,388

130

Civil War (1861-65)

Spanish American War (1898)

Korea (1950-1953)
Vietnam (1964-1972)

54.0

335.9

2,266

15

111.0

494.3

2,204

12

61.0

76.1

306

1

First Gulf War (1990-1991)

Table 2. American Costs of Major Wars
Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Government Printing Office, 1975, vol. 2, series Y and Al Nofi, Statistical Summary:
America’s Major Wars at http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm.
Estimate in 2002 dollars are reflated using the GDP deflator. The costs include
only costs to the U.S. federal budget and generally exclude postwar costs of
veterans’ pensions and health benefits.

___________________________________________________________
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Military Scenarios
An assessment of the costs of a war with Iraq is based on scenarios
for the conduct of the war, the aftermath of hostilities, the impacts on oil
markets, and the macroeconomic effects. It is impossible to project the
detailed military strategies. However, we can describe the general contours
of a “quick victory” and a “protracted conflict” and attempt to put price
tags on each.
The difference between the good and bad cases is unlikely to revolve
around the victor, for there is little doubt among military specialists that the
United States will prevail if it enters with overwhelming force and
perseveres through all obstacles. Rather, the difference lies in the duration
of the conflict, the total damage to Iraq, civilian casualties, the potential for
unconventional warfare, and the spread of the conflict outside Iraq.
Several studies have outlined the likely force requirements for a fullscale invasion of Iraq. A study prepared by the Democratic staff of the
House Budget Committee11 and studies by private specialists such as
Anthony H. Cordesman, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack 12
lay out a plausible starting point for the analysis. Most experts believe that
the war would begin with an intensive bombing of Iraqi targets, focusing
on command and control sites, leadership headquarters, Scud missiles,
CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] weapons sites,
communications infrastructure, and elite Republican guard troops.13
These studies estimate that the U. S. will need to deploy between
150,000 and 350,000 personnel to achieve overwhelming force – this being
approximately half of the troop strength deployed in the First Persian Gulf
War. To some extent, the conduct of the war will be limited by decisions on
Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Iraq: Using Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a
Basis for Estimates, An Analysis by the House Budget Committee, Democratic Staff,
September 23, 2002.

11

Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, September 2002; Michael E.
O’Hanlon, “Three Months to Baghdad,” The Washington Times, August 30, 2002; and
Kenneth J. Pollack, The Gathering Storm: The Case For Invading Iraq, Random House, New
York, 2002, Chapter 11.
12

In addition, there have been several newspaper reports on American battle strategies
purportedly coming from administration sources, but these “leaks” are as likely to be
designed to mislead and to inform.

13
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use of territory by Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Specialists provide a
wide array of scenarios ranging from heavy reliance on Special Forces to
intensive air war to ground invasion, but it seems most likely that if the
U.S. decides to overthrow the current regime it will deploy sufficient forces
to ensure that the job is swiftly accomplished. All scenarios end up with
some form of capitulation by Iraq, occupation of Baghdad, and destruction
or capture of Saddam and Iraq’s top leadership.
The “quick victory” scenario would involve some combination of
strategy and luck in which Saddam Hussein and his top leadership were
captured or killed, the Iraqi ground forces surrendered quickly, and the
presence of U.S. forces prevented civil disorder from breaking out in the
south or Kurdish regions. This is the outcome analyzed in the Democratic
staff report, which envisions between 30 and 60 days of air war, invasion,
and ground combat, followed by 2½ months of post-victory presence by
troops in the theatre. It is hard to see how anything short of preemptive
capitulation by the Saddam regime could be less costly than this scenario.
U.S. casualties under the quick victory strategy might be similar to those in
PGW-I of around 150 fatalities.
When the smoke has cleared, military analysts will spend many years
sifting through the results of the battles. From an economic point of view,
the tactical details are unpredictable, but they are also inessential for the
economic analysis.

Prolonged Conflict and Nasty Outcomes
The quick victory scenario would resemble the first Persian Gulf
War, the Kosovo War, and the Afghanistan war. The outcome might
instead be a prolonged conflict if the dice of war roll unfavorably. Often, as
in the case of September 11, problems arise simply because people thought
they could not or would not happen. Sometimes, things go wrong because
there are no good ways to prevent them. However, the opportunity for
miscalculation is unlimited. Anthony Cordesman concludes his review of
the battlefield prospects by emphasizing the intrinsic uncertainty:
Anyone who looks seriously at this list of independent variables will quickly see
that it is impossible to predict when and how the United States will use decisive
force, the Iraqi response to a U.S.-led coalition, the nature of a U.S.-led coalition,

9

how long Iraq can endure, and what strategy Iraq will actually pursue if it does
use its CBRN weapons.14

Analysts point to a wide variety of potential complications and costs
that need to be contemplated. These include the effects of prolonged
conflict and an Iraqi urban defense strategy; the cost of buying support
from allies; war with Israel; contagion of terrorist acts around the world;
the use of weapons of mass destruction; impact on oil markets; subsequent
terrorist acts inside or outside the United States; macroeconomic shocks;
spillover to other policies; occupation and peacekeeping costs;
reconstruction costs; humanitarian assistance; and costs of nation building.
This section outlines some potential adverse military scenarios, and the
subsequent sections attempts to put a price tag on them where they involve
economic impacts.
Urban defense strategy
A first possibility, viewed as a serious risk by military analysts,
involves an urban defense strategy on the part of the Iraqis. PGW-I was a
turkey shoot in part because the turkeys were in the open desert.
Cordesman described the implications of an urban strategy as follows:15
While much would depend on the loyalty of the population and the army,
dispersing and sheltering in towns and cities would make it much harder to use
air and missile power effectively. Iraqi fixed facilities would remain highly
vulnerable, but Desert Fox, Kovoso, and Afghanistan have all shown that air
targeting and weaponry have not reached the point where it is possible to destroy
massive amounts of major ground weapons without high collateral damage and
civilian casualties. Similarly, forcing the US and its allies to fight urban warfare on
a city-by-city basis means close combat of a kind where many of the technical
advantages of US troops have far less effectiveness. It also would mean giving the
war a far more negative public profile in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The dangers of an urban redoubt strategy were stated forcefully by
retired General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Central Command, before the Senate in September 2002:16

Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, September 2002, p. 81.

14

15

Ibid, pp. 7f.

http://www.fednet.net/archive/ and cited at
http://www.smh.com.au/text/articles/2002/09/27/1032734328055.htm.
16
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The nightmare scenario is that six Iraqi Republican Guard divisions and
six heavy divisions reinforced with several thousand antiaircraft artillery pieces
defend the city of Baghdad. The result would be high casualties on both sides as
well as in the civilian community. U.S. forces would certainly prevail, but at what
cost and what cost as the rest of the world watches while we bomb and have
artillery rounds exploded in densely populated Iraqi neighborhoods…. All our
advantages of command and control, technology, mobility, all of those things are
in part given up and you are working with corporals and sergeants and young
men fighting street to street. It will look like the first 15 minutes of Saving Private
Ryan.

The peril of urban warfare for the United States is that Iraqi forces
have better cover, while U.S. precision weapons are not smart enough to
separate out troops from civilians or tanks from trucks. O’Hanlon notes that
“even after eight years of further modernization after Desert Storm, NATO
airpower was of quite limited effectiveness against small groups of Serb
forces operating within forests, towns, and civilian populations in the
Kosovo war.”17
An urban defense strategy might produce much higher casualties on
both sides. O’Hanlon estimates the casualties in an Iraqi war as follows:18
Based on available methodologies, the likely numbers of U.S. military
personnel killed in a future war to overthrow Saddam Hussein could plausibly
range anywhere from roughly 100, in the event of little fighting, to 5,000, in the
event of intense if relatively short urban combat, with total numbers of wounded
about three to four times as great either way.

An effective urban-defense strategy by Iraq would prolong the
combat, increase casualties, and broaden the destruction of Iraq’s urban
areas and infrastructure. Collateral damage and civilian deaths would
probably be much greater, and the nightly news (or at least the news in the
Arab world) would produce many grisly pictures. Intensive urban fighting
would provoke massive movements of refugees fleeing combat zones and
seeking the protection of American forces. A long and bloody urban
conflict would induce hundreds of thousands of protesters, or more, on the
streets of America, Europe, and the Muslim world.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Counting Casualties: How many people would die in an Iraqi
War?”
Slate, September 25, 2002.

17

18

Id.
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Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons
A major risk is that Iraq might successfully use biological or chemical
weapons. The most likely targets would be U.S. troops, Saudi Arabia, or
Israel. Cordesman provides a useful summary of the prospects:
In spite of some defector claims, it seems doubtful that Saddam has even
one nuclear weapon. The same, however, is probably not true of biological and
chemical weapons and a radiological weapon is possible. Iraq may also have
enough components to assemble as many as 25 Scuds, has shorter range missiles,
can modify drones and combat aircraft to act as “cruise missiles,” and has
significant capability to smuggle weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq and
deliver them covertly. There is considerable evidence that he may have the
capability to make dry, storable biological weapons in aerosol form.19

Unless U.S. forces are caught by surprise, they have protective gear
and training against biological and chemical weapons. However, U.S.
troops have not experienced germs or gas under combat conditions in
modern times, so the effectiveness of training and equipment are not
established. The major threat, however, is the casualties and panic that
would occur if these weapons were launched on civilian populations in
large cities.
Iraqi preemption and wider conflict in the region
Another set of worrisome outcomes would occur if the war spills
outside of Iraq. For example, Iraq might preempt the preemptors by
attacking the population centers of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, or attempting
to destroy the oil facilities of other Gulf states. (I discuss the oil issues
below.)
Alternatively, the conflict might stoke widespread resentment
against the U.S., boiling over into political protests, mob action, adverse
policies, or even regime changes outside Iraq. The parade of concerns
includes attacks by Russia or China on dissident groups or regions, turmoil
in the Indian subcontinent, a takeover of Pakistan by fundamentalists,
military conflict between Israel and its neighbors, or terrorist actions by Al
Qaeda. The range of outcomes here is so broad as to defy any serious
attempt to quantify the likelihood or impacts.
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, But
Dangerous, Poisonous Snake,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December
3, 2001, p. 8.

19
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One particularly dangerous scenario would involve a damaging Iraqi
attack on Israel, perhaps with chemical or biological weapons. Israel would
probably strike back with great ferocity, leading to a further poisoning of
relations between the Israel and the Arab world as well as of U.S.-Arab
relations. A most frightening scenario is described by Cordesman: “If Iraq
should succeed in delivering extremely lethal biological agents against an
Israeli city, Israel would probably massively retaliate with nuclear ground
bursts against every Iraqi city not already occupied by U.S.-led coalition
forces.”20
These three nasty outcomes – urban warfare, unconventional
warfare, and wider escalation – are obvious to both sides. The U.S. has
undoubtedly analyzed these scenarios and has plans to prevent, preempt,
deter, or overcome them.21 Successfully avoiding a wider war is probably
the key to a rapid and relatively bloodless victory.

The Military Costs of a War
What is known about the cost of a war in Iraq? Two conceptual
points need to be made before starting the analysis. First, we are attempting
to estimate the total costs to the nation, not just the budgetary costs. That is,
we are asking how much of our national output will be sacrificed by the
war and its consequences – in effect, the loss of butter because of the resort
to guns.
Second, these calculations should count only the incremental costs of
the war. The 82nd Airborne Division has to be paid whether it is in Iraq or
North Carolina. Only additional costs such as the cost of transport, the
combat pay, and the replacement cost of the munitions should be counted
in the cost of the war. The implication of this conceptual point is that the
cost of a short war is likely to be surprisingly small because most of the
costs have already paid for in the current defense budget.
Lindsey’s Estimates
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, September 2002, p. 45.

20

A report on a new U.S. approach to urban warfare is given in Eric Schmitt and Thom
Shanker, “Threats and Responses: Military Tactics; U.S. Refines Plans For War In Cities,”
The New York Times, October 22, 2002, p. A-1.
21
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The only public estimate of the cost of the war by the Bush
Administration came in an interview by Larry Lindsey, the economist-inresidence in the West Wing. As reported by The Wall Street Journal, Lindsey
estimated the “upper bound” cost of $100 billion to $200 billion. He
dismissed the cost as small, stating that these numbers would be only 1 to 2
percent of U.S. GDP. The Journal report continued:
Mr. Lindsey said that Mr. Hussein's ouster could actually ease the oil problem by
increasing supplies. Iraqi production has been constrained somewhat because of
its limited investment and political factors. “When there is a regime change in
Iraq, you could add three million to five million barrels of production to world
supply” each day, Mr. Lindsey estimated. “The successful prosecution of the war
would be good for the economy.”22

The lead editorial in the Journal joined Lindsey’s upbeat assessment,
opining, “the best way to keep oil prices in check is a short, successful war
on Iraq that begins sooner rather than later.” 23
The next day, the White House spokesman, Scott McClellan
distanced the White House from Lindsey’s interview.24 OMB Director
Mitch Daniels stated that Lindsey’s estimates were “very, very high.” An
authoritative administration source said to the author that he knew of no
basis for Lindsey’s comments. Indeed, the one factual element in Lindsey’s
comments – the statement that a regime change in Iraq could add 3 to 5
million barrels per day (mbpd) to oil production – is far off base. The oil
situation is discussed below, but the general conclusion is that Iraq’s
production in 2001 was close to its sustainable level.
It is certain that the Pentagon has made internal forecasts of the
military cost of the war. The Council of Economic Advisers has reportedly
sent a classified study of the economic impacts of a war in Iraq to the
President. None of these has been made public, nor are they likely to be
released for a decade. In short, aside from Lindsey’s assessment, the
Administration has remained silent on the economic impacts of the war.

22

WSJ, September 15, 2002.

23

WSJ, September 15, 2002 (“Saddam’s Oil”).

24

White House Daily Briefing, September 16, 2002.
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Estimates by the Democratic Staff of the House Budget Committee
There were two published studies of the prospective cost of a war
with Iraq prepared by government budget analysts through the midNovember 2002. One was undertaken by the Democratic Staff of the House
Budget Committee (the House study)25 and the second was by the
Congressional Budget Office (the CBO study).26
This House study was a “top down” analysis. It assumed that the costs
of the second Persian Gulf War could be projected based on the costs of the
1990-91 conflict. The study priced two scenarios for the war. The most
relevant one is “New War A,” which involves 250,000 troops (the other
scenario plans for only half that number). As Table 3 shows, New War A is
estimated to cost between $48 billion and $60 billion. 27 This figure is slightly
less than the earlier war, which cost about $80 billion in today’s dollars.

Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Iraq: Using Desert Shield/Desert Storm as Basis
for Estimates, An Analysis by the House Budget Committee, Democratic Staff, September
23, 2002 (hereafter, “House study”).

25

Congressional Budget Office, “Estimated Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq,”
September 2002, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ (“CBO study”).

26

The House study also includes interest costs in the estimates. These costs are
inappropriate, however, for they depend upon the financing of the war.
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Table 3. Comparing the Costs of the First Persian Gulf War to Estimates of
the New War Scenario “A” (in billions of 2002 dollars)
Source: House Study, p. 2.

____________________________________________________________
Most of the cost involves fuel and extra costs for the buildup. The costs
labeled “investment” are somewhat vague but appear to include the
replacement cost of weapons, ammunition, weapon systems, and other
equipment. The total costs of the Second Persian Gulf War (PGW-II) are
estimated to be smaller than those for PGW-I because the size of the force is
estimated to be about half as large.
The advantage of relying upon the costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm
is that these represent the actual costs of operating in the same theater of
operations against the same enemy. Therefore, as long as the war unfolds in
roughly the same manner, the estimates are likely to be relatively accurate.

Estimates by the Congressional Budget Committee
The CBO study used a different methodology from the House study. It
examined two options – a “heavy ground” option involving 370,000 military
personnel in the Persian Gulf and a “heavy air” option relying primarily on
air power with 250,000 military personnel. The CBO methodology was a
“bottom up” approach, which priced out the components and added them
up, rather than the “top down” approach of the House study, which priced
the war based on the numbers from the earlier conflict.
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Table 4 shows the CBO’s building blocks used to estimate the costs of
the “heavy ground” war. Two parts, deployment and redeployment, are
fixed in nature and total about $20 billion. The other component of wartime
cost is combat, estimated to cost $9 billion per month for the first month and
$8 billion for subsequent months. (The heavy air scenario costs slightly less.)

Table 4. Costs of Different Components of a War in Iraq for Heavy Ground
Force Option (in billions of 2002 dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office Study, Table 3.
________________________________________________________________
We can compare the two studies by plugging the assumptions for
duration in the House report into the CBO costs for the different components.
The “New War A” assumption in Table 3 assumed 30 days of combat plus 2½
months of post-combat presence in the region. For a conflict of that duration,
the CBO formula yields $44 billion as compared to the House study estimate
of $48 billion to $60 billion.
The two studies come to a slightly different conclusion, which is not
surprising given that they use completely different methodologies. A
reasonable ballpark estimate based on these two studies is that the cost of a
short and successful war would be around $50 billion. This compares with
the cost of $80 billion for PGW-I in 2002 dollars.
Neither report estimates the costs of a protracted war. These costs
would depend upon the length of the conflict, the extent to which it spread to
other countries, and the need for the United States to devote more resources
to the conduct of the war. Pollack considers a six-month ground invasion to
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be the outer limit of the length of the conflict.28 One might rather consider, as
a reasonable upper bound, the case where Iraq pursued an urban defense
strategy and where some of the neighboring countries refused basing and
overflight rights to the U.S. In this situation, the conflict, including buildup
and mopping up operations, might drag on for a year, and the U.S. might
need to devote 50 percent more resources than in the “heavy ground” option
analyzed by the CBO. In that case, the cost would rise from $50 billion to
around $140 billion. While much larger, these military costs would still be
only around 1½ percent of GDP – on the scale of the Mexican or SpanishAmerican wars rather than the more costly Vietnam or Korean wars.

Costs of Postwar Occupation and Reconstruction
The two Congressional studies are valuable contributions to public
awareness of the costs of the coming war. They are incomplete, however,
because they explicitly exclude a number of potential costs, generally nonmilitary in nature, most of which are highly uncertain. The reports exclude,
with the exception of a brief mention in the CBO study, estimates of the total
costs of occupation, peacekeeping, democratization, nation building, and
humanitarian assistance. They assume that there will be no use of weapons of
mass destruction or subsequent terrorist activities. Furthermore, they exclude
the costs of persuading other nations to support the U.S and exclude impacts
upon oil supplies, macroeconomic activity, and the federal budget.
This point was put more dramatically by James Fallows, who recently
asked a number of experts, “What will the U.S. do when it gets to
Baghdad?”29 He found a long list of worries. The U.S. might easily face a
humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands of wounded and hundreds of
thousands of refugees without adequate shelter or food. Someone will have
to do the policing to keep yesterday’s victims from becoming tomorrow’s
tyrants. The U.S. might face the cleanup of any biological or chemical
weapons attacks; anthrax, for example, can remain potent for many years.
Moreover, the Iraqi population might view the Americans as occupation
troops rather than as liberators – in essence, they might see themselves as
Palestinians on the Tigris.

Kenneth J. Pollack, The Gathering Storm: The Case For Invading Iraq, Random House,
New York, 2002, Chapter 11.
29 James Fallows, “A ‘Liberated’ Iraq Could End Up Like Weimar Germany,” September
24, 2002, Guardian/UK.
28
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Occupation and peacekeeping
General Wesley Clark, who oversaw implementation of the Bosnia
peace accord and commanded NATO forces in Kosovo, recommended that,
after a war in Iraq, the United States should plan for humanitarian assistance,
police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction
assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body.30
It seems highly likely that there will need to be a substantial
occupation and peacekeeping force in Iraq for a lengthy period after the war.
There is no evidence that the American people are prepared for the potential
scale of the operation. Gordon and O’Hanlon provide the following
estimates:31
[T]o avoid the risk of prolonged conflict among various Kurdish, Shi’a, and
Sunni groups, which could draw Iraq’s neighbors into a regional conflict, the United
States would need to lead a major international effort to help form a stable national
government. Such an effort could require a multi-year military presence by tens of
thousands of U.S. military forces, implying annual military costs of at least $10
billion. (In Bosnia, one-eighth the size of Iraq and with one-sixth the population,
NATO deemed it necessary to deploy over 50,000 peacekeeping troops, at a cost of
some $10 billion per year; six years later nearly 20,000 troops remain).

Pollack’s estimated that the force size required for security in Iraq might
initially be as high as 250,000 to 300,000, but that after five years the forces
could be reduced to 100,000.32
The CBO estimates are considerably higher than Gordon and
O’Hanlon’s:
The costs associated with an occupation force for Iraq remain highly
uncertain, varying from about $1 billion to $4 billion a month, depending on the
assumptions used about force size and operations. Some military experts suggest

Statement Of General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army (Retired), Before The House Armed
Services Committee United States House Of Representatives, September 26, 2002 at
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/0209-26clark.html.
30

Philip H. Gordon and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq?
Implementing a Bush Doctrine on Deterrence,” Brookings, Policy Brief #93, January 2002.
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Kenneth J. Pollack, The Gathering Storm: The Case For Invading Iraq, Random House,
New York, 2002, p. 398.
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that a force of up to 75,000 peacekeepers might be needed; another plan discussed
by the U.S. Central Command calls for up to 200,000 troops. For its estimate, CBO
used an average cost for a U.S. Army peacekeeper consistent with experiences in
Bosnia and Kosovo, and assumed that U.S. force levels would range between 75,000
and 200,000 troops. It also assumed that replacement occupation personnel and
equipment would be periodically rotated to the theater in a manner similar to that
used in recent peacekeeping activities. However, current Army forces would be
unable to support those rotations for a prolonged 200,000-person occupation.33

The CBO numbers are between $17 billion to $46 billion per year, or
approximately $250,000 per peacekeeper per year. This figure is at the low
end of the estimated cost of U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo; it might actually
underestimate the cost if the post-combat environment in Iraq is hostile and
its dangers resemble the West Bank more than the Balkans.
The duration of the occupation-peacekeeping effort is unpredictable.
The occupation of Japan lasted seven years, while the U.S. has stationed more
than 30,000 troops in South Korea for a half-century. It is difficult to see how
a successful occupation of Iraq could be less than five years and might easily
extend for two decades. While there are no public estimates of the total, a
minimum cost would be $75 billion and an upper bound of $500 billion over
the next decade is consistent with peacekeeping operations in the Balkans
and the size and scope of the task in Iraq.34
Reconstruction costs and nation building
The democratization of Iraq is one of the most politically appealing
aspects of the Bush administration’s current policy. The stated U.S. policy is
to “promote the emergence of a democratic government.” President Bush
committed the United States to nation building in his October 7, 2002
address:
Freed from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to share in the
progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is necessary, the United States
and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the
institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.35
33

CBO Report, p. 4.

The low and high numbers assume, respectively, peacekeeper costs of $200,000 to
$250,000 per peacekeeper per year, with the numbers from 75,000 to 200,000, and for a
period of 5 to 10 years.
34
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
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This goal has been widely praised by columnists and political leaders, as
exemplified by Thomas Friedman’s appraisal:
So I am for invading Iraq only if we think that doing so can bring about regime
change and democratization. Because what the Arab world desperately needs is a
model that works—a progressive Arab regime that by its sheer existence would
create pressure and inspiration for gradual democratization and modernization
around the region.36

When some semblance of order has been imposed, the U.S. and its
coalition partners must turn to reconstruction and nation building. What are
the goals for Iraq, and how would these goals be accomplished? Would the
regime change be followed by turning over the reins of power to local
representatives as occurred with the Loya Jirga as in Afghanistan? Would the
U.S. install an occupation regime like those in Germany or Japan after World
War II, imposing a western-style constitution, a free press, free elections, and
all the other infrastructure of western democracy? Would the U.S. introduce
a new Marshall Plan for democracies of the Middle East?
Planning for postwar Iraq within the Bush Administration is in its
infancy. Newspaper reports on one day in mid-October suggested that the
Bush administration was coalescing around a plan modeled after the postwar
occupation of Japan. However, the very next day, administration sources
indicated that the Japanese model had too much of the taint of “occupation”
and that the U.S. would be friends rather than enemies. About the same time,
Secretary of State Powell candidly described the state of U.S. planning: “And
we are obviously doing contingency planning, and there are lots of different
models from history that one could look at: Japan, Germany, but I wouldn't
say that anything has been settled upon...”37 Therefore, the answer clearly is
that as of mid-October, the U.S. does not know what it will do when it gets to
Baghdad.
Scholars who have studied the problems of nation building caution
that the process is difficult, costly, and fraught with dilemmas. Recent
examples of U.S. nation building, including Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan,
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Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, September 18, 2002.

Interview by Robert Siegel of NPR's “All Things Considered” with Secretary Colin L.
Powell, Washington, D.C., October 11, 2002, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/14344.htm
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indicate that the United States has not discovered any formulas for quick
success. A recent review of efforts concludes:
Like Afghanistan, Iraq is a country torn by profound ideological, religious and
ethnic conflicts. Before democratization can even begin, the United States would
have to assemble a power-sharing agreement among ethnic Kurds, Shiites, and
Sunni Muslims. Because no obvious leader is waiting in the wings and the exiled
Iraqi opposition is chronically divided, Washington would have to provide the
political and, most importantly, military and security infrastructure necessary for
holding a new government together. In short, the United States would have to
become engaged in nation building on a scale that would dwarf any other such
effort since the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. And it
would have to stay engaged not just years, but decades, given the depth of change
required to make Iraq into a democracy.38

The length of the nation-building effort is highly uncertain, but it is
hard to see how a serious attempt to turn Iraq into a modern democratic
society could be accomplished in less than a decade. This effort is orders of
magnitude more than the United States has undertaken in the region in the
past; the U.S. spent about $250 million on democracy programs in the Middle
East in the last decade.
Reconstruction needs will depend upon the extent of destruction
during a war as well as the current situation of the Iraqi economy. There are
several different approaches to estimating this number. A 1991 report to the
United Nations on restoring Iraq’s infrastructure back to its prewar condition
estimated a cost of $22 billion in 1991 prices.39 Converting this into 2002
prices and accounting for further deterioration in Iraq’s economy and for a
short war suggests that $30 billion in reconstruction costs would be a
reasonable estimate. An alternative approach is to look at the capital-output
ratio for oil-rich developing countries like Iraq. This number is usually in the
range of 1 to 2. If Iraq is to attain a per capita GDP equal to Egypt or Iran, and
if one-half of the capital stock requires rebuilding, this would imply
rebuilding needs of about $1200 per capita, or a total of $30 billion. Estimates
by the World Bank have found that rebuilding in Lebanon, East Timor, and
Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, and Daniel Brumberg,
“Democratic Mirage in the Middle East,” Policy Brief no. 20, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 2002.
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Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by
a mission led by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary- General for humanitarian assistance in
Iraq, S/22799, 17 July 1991. Excerpts are available at
http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/s22799.html.
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Bosnia would require approximately $1000 per person, which implies a total
of around $25 billion. 40 I take an estimate of $30 billion in 2002 dollars as the
best guess for the minimal rebuilding needs in postwar Iraq (including the oil
sector).
A more ambitious plan would be a “Marshall Plan for Iraq.”41 To
refresh our memories, recall that the Marshall Plan cost the United States
$13.3 billion over a four-year period, this being about 4½ percent of the GDP
of that period, or about $450 billion as a share of today’s GDP. At today’s
income levels, the assistance comprised about $2000 per person, or $500 per
person per year, in the recipient countries, which is about two times the size
of the minimal figure cited above.
The parallel is optimistic, even simplistic, for the Marshall plan was
introduced after the countries of Western Europe had undertaken a
substantial part of their reconstruction efforts, and European countries had
most of the infrastructure of democracy and civil society in place before the
war. Moreover, the threat of an Islamic republic, or even a fundamentalist
regime, in Iraq will worry nation builders looking to other countries, like Iran
or Algeria. To recognize that the nation building in Iraq begins with much
less social capital and civic infrastructure, we might conservatively expect
that the effort would be six rather than four years of effort at the expenditure
rate of the Marshall Plan, for a total of $75 billion.
The numbers for both reconstruction and nation building, therefore,
are substantial, from a minimum $30 billion for reconstruction to as much as
$105 billion.

World Bank, “Afghanistan: World Bank Approach Paper,” November 2001, available at
lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/ az/$File/afgApproach.pdf.
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Roger D. Carstens, “A Marshal plan for Iraq,” The Washington Times, August 5, 2002.
(“The solution is to provide U.S. leadership in the implementation of a Marshall plan for
Iraq. An Iraq that is stable, strong and pro-American is in our interests. Both America and
the people of Iraq deserve it.”)
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Humanitarian assistance
Humanitarian assistance will be necessary to feed, house, clothe, and
care for the refugees, wounded, and ill in Iraq, and possibly in neighboring
countries. Estimates of the costs of humanitarian assistance are uncertain
because they involve knowing the population at risk, the level of need after
the war, and the duration of the assistance.
One benchmark for estimating the cost of humanitarian assistance is
the experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina (including Republika Srpska)
during the 1990s. Humanitarian assistance in the country was $5 - 6 billion
during the war and $7 - 8 billion in the post-war period, for a total of $12 - 14
billion over a period of approximately a decade. On a per capita basis, this
amounted to approximately $500 per person per year.42
Only the roughest of estimates are available for the cost of
humanitarian assistance. A plausible estimate would be that 1 to 5 million
residents of Iraq (out of a total population of around 24 million) would
require assistance in the post-war environment. If the time required for
assistance was between two and four years, then the total cost of
humanitarian assistance would be $1 billion to $10 billion.
Who Will Pay for the War?
Who will pay for all these efforts? Iraq has one major advantage
compared to recently damaged countries like Afghanistan, Serbia, Bosnia, or
Kosovo because it has major oil resources that might be tapped. If Iraq could
rebuild its production back to 3 million barrels per day, this would yield
around $25 billion per year at prevailing oil prices.
However, claims on these resources will be numerous. To begin with,
these revenues amount to only $1000 per capita in today’s Iraq, and much of
these funds will be required for domestic fuel use and imports of food,
medicines, and other necessities of daily life. Some revenues would be
needed to finance the rebuilding and upgrading of Iraq’s economic
infrastructure. Additionally, Iraq has close to $100 billion of foreign debts
and Kuwaiti reparation claims. As of early 2002, there were $78 billion of

Žarko Papić, “Normal Social Policy and International Humanitarian Assistance in the
Conflict Context,” IBHI, Sarajevo, October 2000, available at
www.stakes.fi/gaspp/seminar/papapic.pdf.
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business claims against Iraq, but only $3.6 billion had been paid by Iraq.43
The claims against Iraq after the 1991 war totaled over $300 billion. Given all
these claims, to divert funds from vital necessities to pay the expenses of the
U. S. occupation forces would be economic and political folly.
Will other countries step up to pay the bills, as they did after the First
Persian Gulf War? Probably not. If the war is undertaken without U.N.
sanction or broad international support, the U.S. could be forced to pay the
lion’s share of the costs. Indeed, the United States may actually need to
increase assistance or provide debt relief to countries to persuade them to
join a coalition. The House study suggests that the U.S. might need to forgive
up to $4 billion in Turkish loans to gain Turkey’s participation in the effort.
This would not be a direct economic cost but would qualify as a “negative
allied contribution” to the cost of the war.
Can these costs be covered by the United Nations? Current U.N.
peacekeeping efforts of $2.6 billion per year are a pittance by comparison to
the needs in post-war Iraq. In addition, payments for U.N. peacekeeping
missions are in arrears, and little of the half-billion dollar commitment for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan has been paid.
Will the U.S. actually undertake the massive effort required to rebuild
and democratize Iraq? In virtually every country where the U.S. intervened
militarily over the last four decades, it has displayed a “hit and run”
philosophy where bombing runs have seldom been followed by construction
crews. The latest war in Afghanistan is a signal example. In the year ending
September 2002, the U.S. spent $13 billion on the war effort. By contrast, the
total Pentagon effort has committed only $10 million to civil works and
humanitarian aid.
The disproportion between military destruction and civilian
construction in Afghanistan and elsewhere does not augur well for an
ambitious rebuilding effort in Iraq. Is it plausible that such an enormous
civilian effort will be appropriated when the U.S. today spends only $15
billion annually on foreign aid for the entire world? The prospect of an
ambitious nation-building plan that is left half-built is the most realistic
prospect.

"Iraq Presses Firms to Forgo Billions in War Reparations," Wall Street Journal, June 21,
2002.

43

25

Broader Economic Impacts: Oil Markets and the Overall
Economy
The economic ripples of a war with Iraq are likely to spread beyond
the direct budgetary costs, with the prospect of raising the cost of imported
petroleum, slowing productivity growth, and possibly triggering a recession.
These broader economic impacts will depend largely on the war’s effects on
oil prices and the psychological reactions that might occur if a war is
protracted or has unfavorable side effects of the kind discussed above.
Concerns about oil markets in the context of war in the Middle East are
not idle. Every recession in the last three decades has been associated directly
or indirectly with turmoil in oil market, terrorism, or war. Both of the oilprice shocks of the 1970s led to sharp recessions, while the First Persian Gulf
War induced a sharp spike in oil prices that contributed to the 1990 recession.
Talk of war over the last half year has produced a “war premium” in oil
prices amounting to perhaps $5 a barrel.
In weighing potential costs of a war, it is useful to analyze first the
impacts of war that operate directly through oil and energy markets and
second the effects on the broader economy. The oil-market effect operates by
raising the costs of imported oil as well as by lowering productivity growth.
The broader economic impact, which is associated with the business cycle,
comes through the impact on the economy of defense spending as well as
psychological effects operating through private investment and
consumption. I discuss each of these two mechanisms in turn.
Oil Markets
Background on oil markets
War in the Persian Gulf would affect the economy if oil prices rise
sharply due to production declines arising either from physical damage or if
oil producers restrict production after the war.
When pressed on the reasons for the first Persian Gulf War, Secretary
of State James Baker stated the reason was “jobs, jobs, jobs.” When later
asked what this meant, Baker stated, “[T]he fact of the matter is it would
have boiled down to jobs if Saddam Hussein had been able to control the
flow of oil from the Persian Gulf or to, by controlling his own oil and
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Kuwaiti’s oil, act in a way to influence prices.”44 So, perhaps Baker was really
saying that the reason for the war was “oil, oil, oil.”
The current administration has said little about jobs or oil, although the
interview with Larry Lindsey suggests that thoughts about improved oil
security and control of Iraq’s oil resources after the war may be hidden in the
classified analyses. Whatever the role of oil supplies in the Bush
administration’s calculus, many foreign nations suspect that getting control
of Iraqi oil supplies for American companies and American SUVs is high on
the American priority list.
Some background information will be useful for this discussion. World
oil consumption in 2000 and 2001 averaged around 68 million barrels per day
(mbpd). OPEC was responsible for approximately 29 mbpd, or 42 percent, of
the total. The Arab states plus Iran contributed 22 mbpd, or 32 percent, of
world production. Excess capacity in OPEC countries in 2001 was around 4
mbpd, which was dangerously low by historical standards (there is little or
no excess capacity outside OPEC). In earlier periods, when excess capacity
dipped to or below 4 mbpd – as occurred in 1973-74, 1978-79, and 1991 – oil
prices rose sharply.
A particularly worrisome outcome would be a wholesale destruction
of oil facilities in Iraq, and possibly in Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In the
first Persian Gulf War, Iraq destroyed much of Kuwait’s petroleum
infrastructure as it withdrew. The damage included most of Kuwait’s oil
wells in addition to refineries and export facilities. The sabotage was
apparently well planned, and not just a last minute act of revenge, and shut
down Kuwaiti oil production for approximately a year. 45 Kuwait’s
production was 0.2 mbpd in 1991, 1.1 mbpd in 1992, and only reached 1.9
mbpd – close to prewar levels – by 1993.
Cordesman suggests the possibility of a reprise: “Saddam Hussein
might well see burning Iraq’s oil fields and CBRN [chemical, biological,

Frontline/BBC, “Oral History,” January 1996, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/baker/5.html.
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radiological, or nuclear] attacks on major Gulf oil fields as both a defense and
form of revenge.”46
Unless the Iraqi leadership is caught completely off-guard, destruction
of Iraq’s oil production facilities in a new war is probably within the
capabilities of Iraqi forces. There is no military logic behind this step, but
such an act of revenge cannot be ruled out. This would reduce world oil
capacity by about 3 mbpd. Sabotage of Kuwait’s northern oil fields is not
impossible, particularly as a preemptive measure, but sabotage of other
countries’ oil fields would require a military operation that Iraq was unable
to accomplish in PGW-I and is even less capable of undertaking today.
Contamination of major areas by biological or chemical means would pose
much greater problems for oil markets, but the risks of that contingency are
impossible to assess.
A final possibility is a concerted reduction in oil production. This
might occur through a boycott against the U.S. and other Western countries,
such as the one that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, or if control of a
substantial part of OPEC’s oil resources fell under the control of anti-Western
elements. This possibility is worrisome because of the high degree of
dependence of industrial countries, particularly the United States, on
imported oil.
Potential impacts of a third oil-price shock
Among the dizzying array of possible unfavorable outcomes in oil
markets, I analyze first an unfavorable case and then a favorable case. For the
unfavorable case, I analyze an oil-market shock similar in magnitude to the
oil-price shocks of 1973-74 and 1978-79. In each of these periods, restrictions
in production led to sharp increases in the price of oil imports. From 1972 to
1974, prices of imported oil rose by a factor of four, while from 1978 to 1980
prices rose by a factor of slightly under three.
The unfavorable case assumes a decline in world oil production of 7
million barrels per day, partially offset by a drawdown of 2½ million barrels
per day from strategic oil reserves. Many combinations of events – arising
from wartime destruction, terrorism, or political reaction of governments in
the region – could lead to such an outcome. Specific examples would be
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, September 2002, p. 81.
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destruction of most of Iraq’s oil-production capacity along with one-quarter
of the productive capacity of other Gulf states. Another possible cause would
be an OPEC boycott that cut oil production by 25 percent. The boycott route
is economically plausible in oil markets because producer profits go up
rather than down with lower production.
We should avoid the common fallacy of thinking that the U.S. or any
country can insulate its economy from an oil shock because it imports oil
from “safe” sources. As long as oil prices are determined in the world
market, oil is a fungible commodity, and a price shock anywhere affects
importers everywhere.
A recent study by George Perry analyzed the short-run impacts of
disruptions of world oil supplies. He analyzed a bad case, a worse case, and a
worst case. His “worse” case is the same as the unfavorable case analyzed
here. The results of Perry’s three scenarios for the first year are shown in
Table 5. Focusing on the worse case, Perry projects a tripling of oil prices to
around $75 per barrel, with gasoline rising to almost $3 per gallon. The cost
of imported oil is projected to rise about $200 billion per year, and the
projected decline in real GDP is almost 3 percent. Perry’s projection is not
entirely appropriate for the present purpose because it extends for only a
single year and because it includes business-cycle elements in the costs along
with productivity losses.
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Baseline

Bad Case

Worse Case Worst Case

World production shock (mbpd)
Less: supply from reserves (mbpd)

0
0

-3.5
2.5

-7
2.5

-10
2.5

Net supply change (mbpd)

0

-1

-4.5

-7.5

Crude oil price ($/barrel)

25

32

75

161

Gasoline price ($/gallon)

1.60

1.76

2.78

4.84

Change in real GDP
Percent

0.0%

0.6%

2.7%

4.6%

Billions (2002 $)

0

62

282

478

Table 5. Impact of Oil Supply Disruption on the U.S. Economy
Source: George L. Perry, “The War on Terrorism, the World Oil Market and the US
Economy,” Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper #7, October 24, 2001, available at
http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/perry/20011024.htm. For a description of
the scenarios, see text.

__________________________________________________________
To estimate the total impact of an oil-price shock similar to that of
Perry’s worse case, I follow his methodology by assuming that oil prices rise
by a factor of three in 2003. Based on historical data, I further assume that the
real oil price regresses back to the pre-shock level at a rate of 20 percent per
year. I then track the impact on real national income47 over the next decade
assuming full employment and using a neoclassical economic model of oil
markets described in the appendix. 48 (The Keynesian or business-cycle effects
are provided in the next section.)

“Real national income” is a measure of income that measures sustainable consumption.
It first adjusts GDP by subtracting depreciation to get net domestic product; it then
adjusts net domestic product by subtracting the decline in living standards that would be
caused by higher prices of imported oil. In technical language, it includes a correction for
changes in the terms of trade.
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The estimates provided here are described in the appendix, which sketches a model of
the oil sector that can be used to estimate the impact on the U.S. economy of changes in oil
prices. The model is a full-employment, putty-clay model in which the price elasticity of
demand for oil is relatively low in the short run because the capital stock is inflexible, but
the elasticity becomes larger over time as the capital stock is replaced.
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The impact of the “worse” oil shock is a reduction in real national
income of $175 billion in the first year and $778 billion over the entire decade
(the full results are shown in Table A-1 in the appendix). One-seventh of the
decadal cost comes in higher cost of imported oil, while the balance comes in
lower domestic production. For the first-year cost, $148 billion comes from
the higher cost of imported oil and $27 billion in lower domestic output. The
first-year numbers are considerably lower than Perry’s estimates because
they assume full employment, whereas Perry’s GDP loss primarily arises
from business-cycle impacts, which are analyzed in the next section.
Our summary estimate is that an oil-price shock of the kind seen in the
1970s and assumed in Perry’s “worse” case would have extremely adverse
impacts totaling $778 billion over the decade following the war. The impact
would be smaller if the price shock were smaller or more short-lived than
assumed, and it would be larger if macroeconomic, economic, or political
frictions were added to the irreducible minimum for the full-employment
economy modeled here.
A “happy” outcome in oil markets
Some strategists may be betting that a successful war in Iraq will
liberate Iraqi oil as well as the Iraqi people. A quick victory in Iraq followed
by relative stability in the region could lead to increases in oil-production
capacity in Iraq, Iran, and other countries, putting downward pressure on oil
prices in the years ahead. Some observers have pointed to the possibility of
$10 per barrel oil and gasoline below $1 per gallon.
Such a scenario is not physically impossible. A rapid development of
Iraqi oil resources could flood the market with oil, drive down oil prices, and
give a boost to industrial economies. But there are several obstacles down
that path: the physical and financial requirements for oil-field expansion,
OPEC quotas, resistance to Iraqi oil growth from OPEC and other oil
producers, and reluctance of oil-importing countries to become even more
dependent on Persian Gulf oil.49
We can sketch out a reasonable “happy” scenario as follows. After two
decades of war and sanctions, Iraq’s oil infrastructure is poorly maintained
and plagued by technical difficulties. From a peak of around 3.5 mbpd in
A full treatment of the issues is contained in Adam Sieminski et al., Oil Market Outlook:
OPEC’s Balancing Act, Deutsche Bank, September 5, 2002; J.J. Traynor et al., Baghdad
Bazaar: Big Oil in Iraq, October 21, 2002; and Philip Verleger, “Oil Markets After Saddam,”
undated from Fall 2002.
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1979, Iraq’s current capacity declined to between 2.8 and 3.0 mbpd in 2002.
Oil production in 2000 and 2001 was close to capacity at 2.5 mbpd. Experts
believe that, if restructuring operations can operate effectively, Iraq’s
production capacity can be raised to between 3 and 4 mbpd within two years.
Iraq has enormous oil resources relative to its current production, as
noted above. Iraq has negotiated $40 billion of contracts with Russia, China,
and France to develop approximately 5 mbpd of new capacity. 50 While
threatening the United States with the oil weapon, these contracts were in the
nature of “oil carrots.” They were negotiated on extremely favorable terms
and were probably devoted more with an eye to gaining Security Council
vetoes or foot-dragging than to adding capacity. The jockeying for contracts
in postwar Iraq is likely to be time-consuming, particularly if the U.S. tries to
ensure “equity” for its own companies. Unless the U.S. decides to treat Iraq
as a fifty-first state – Texas on the Tigris – developing new oil fields is likely
to be a contentious and lengthy process.
The most important limitation on Iraqi oil expansion revolves around
its OPEC membership and quota. Iraq has been a card-carrying member since
the founding of OPEC. Since the First Persian Gulf War, Iraq’s oil production
has in principle (but not of late in practice) been controlled by the United
Nations. In the postwar era, a first decision Iraq’s decision makers will face is
whether to remain in OPEC.
A decision to quit OPEC would have major political and economic
ramifications. The economic beneficiaries would be the oil-importing
countries, primarily the United States, which could enjoy economic growth
with low oil prices for many years to come. If the decision to quit were
dictated from Washington, it would be the economic equivalent of the recent
national security doctrine that trumpets the United States’ hegemony over
the world.51 But the political implications are also far-reaching. Forcing Iraq
out of OPEC, and encouraging a major production increase by Iraq, would be
an economic declaration of war on OPEC. It would lower incomes in all the
major Middle East countries, deal a blow to the Russian economy, and could
destabilize the region from Algiers to Novosibirsk. From the U.S. point of
view, it would be a myopic policy leading to even greater dependency upon
Persian Gulf oil supplies and inviting decades more of political, economic,
See J. J. Traynor et al., Baghdad Bazaar: Big Oil in Iraq, October 21, 2002 and U.S. Energy
Information Agency, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html.
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The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17,2002, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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and military struggles in that region. The conjunction of circumstances that
would lead to a free fall in oil prices in a world without OPEC constraints
might qualify as a “best economic case” but it is sufficiently remote that I
have not included it in the “happy” outcome for oil markets.
If Iraq stays in OPEC, then it will attempt to negotiate a high quota.
Experts believe that Iraq is unlikely to get a major increase from its prior
quota of 2.8 mbpd, and a quota equal to that of Iran (currently 3.2 mbpd)
would seem a plausible one for Iraq.52 Even with a small amount of cheating,
an outer limit of 3½ mbpd would seem the outer limit of Iraq’s new
production level if it remains in OPEC. Assuming that this was accompanied
by no change in the quotas, cheating, or excess capacity of other countries,
the net effect would be an increase in OPEC oil production of about 2/3
million barrels per day.
What would be the beneficial impact of such an increase in Iraqi oil
production? Assuming a trend (no war) oil-price path of $25 barrel in 2002,
which rises gradually thereafter, the model described in the appendix
estimates that an oil price of $0.92 per barrel below trend over the postwar
decade would balance supply and demand in the happy case. Figure 1 shows
the projected oil prices in the trend case along with the paths for the adverse
and happy cases. For the happy case, lower prices have no net effect on the
cost of imported oil and raise productivity by $40 billion over the decade. The
total effect would be an increase in U.S. real national income of $40 billion
over the postwar decade at full employment.

See Adam Sieminski et al., Oil Market Outlook: OPEC’s Balancing Act, Deutsche Bank,
September 5, 2002.
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Figure 1. Oil Prices in the Trend, Worse, and Happy Scenarios
Source: See text and appendix.

__________________________________________________________________
Impacts on Aggregate Spending and the Business Cycle
Historically, economic expansions were the constant companions of
war. As can be seen in Table 6, the iron law of wartime booms was caused by
the large wartime increases in military expenditures. In World War II, for
example, defense outlays rose by almost 10 percent of total GDP before Pearl
Harbor, and this spending boosted the economy out of the doldrums of the
Great Depression. Similar but smaller military buildups accompanied
economic expansions in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
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Economic Stimulus from Defense Spending

War

World War II
Before Pearl Harbor
All years
Korean War
Vietnam War
Persian Gulf War I

Increase in Defense
Spending as
Percent of GDP

Period

1939-41
1939-44
1950:3 to 1951:3
1965:3 to 1967:1
1990:3 to 1991:1

Real GDP
growth over
buildup
period
(percent)

9.7%
41.4%
8.0%
1.9%
0.3%

26.7%
69.1%
10.5%
9.7%
-1.3%

Table 6. Size of Defense Buildup and Economic Expansion in Past Conflicts
Source: Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts,
available at www.bea.gov.

___________________________________________________________
The iron law of wartime booms ended with the First Persian Gulf War.
One of the reasons why the iron law was repealed is that defense spending
during the First Persian Gulf War increased by only 0.3 percent of GDP.
Because the public sector provided little expansionary impetus, the course of
macroeconomic activity was determined by the private sector, which in turn
was driven in the short run by psychological reactions to the war.
The major psychological factors that affect the economy in the short
run are those driving stock prices, exchange rates, and consumer sentiment.
Sharp drops in consumer sentiment and stock prices tend to depress
investment and consumer spending, particularly on consumer durables.
Sharp declines in the exchange rate of the dollar tend to raise inflation and
are sometimes associated with declines in asset prices.
Figure 2 shows the dramatic psychoeconomic reaction to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The figure shows indexes of consumer
sentiment, stock prices, the exchange rate of the dollar, and industrial
production; each variable has been normalized to equal 1 in July 1990, the
month before the invasion. Consumer sentiment and the stock market both
took a nosedive after the initial Iraqi invasion. They then recovered sharply
with the quick U.S. victory in February 1991. Industrial production reacted
gradually to the resulting decrease in demand. The recession was sharp, but,
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notwithstanding the general euphoria after the 100-hours war (seen in the
upturn in consumer sentiment), the recovery was slow. The total shortfall of
GDP relative to its potential from the beginning of the war until the end of
1991 was around $490 billion (in 2002 prices).

1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
1990:07

1990:10

1991:01

S&P stock price index
Exchange rate on dollar

1991:04
Industrial production
Consumer sentiment

Figure 2. Major Factors Determining Short Run Economic Behavior After
the Beginning of the first Persian Gulf War
Source: Data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Board,
Standard and Poor’s Corporation, and the University of Michigan. Each series is
normalized by setting its value equal to 1.00 in July 1990.

_______________________________________________________
What is likely to be the overall economic impact of a war in Iraq? The
increase in defense spending over the last year (2001:3 through 2002:3) was
small, only 0.3 percent of GDP. Since early 2002, markets have discounted the
prospect of a war – or at least of a short war. Stock prices have fallen 25
percent, the dollar has depreciated, oil prices have risen sharply, and indexes
of consumer sentiment are at their lowest level for almost a decade. Fears of
war are hard to separate from the bursting of the dot-com bubble, a weak
economy, corporate scandals, and poor profits, but most of the adverse
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psychological reaction to a short war has probably already occurred.
Assuming that oil prices are stable and victory is swift, a repetition of the
1990-91 recession is unlikely and the macroeconomic impact is likely to be nil
to favorable.
If the war goes badly, the macroeconomic outcome might turn sour.
The dangers of tipping into recession are real, particularly given that the U.S.
economy was growing very slowly in fall of 2002. If there is some
combination of heavy casualties, protracted urban warfare, gory pictures on
the nightly news, massive foreign denunciations of American policy, rumors
or reality of chemical or biological weapons, or major terrorist actions at
home or abroad, the economic reactions might resemble the sharp economic
declines following the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 war or the attacks of
September 11.
The most likely cause of a business-cycle downturn is an oil-price
shock of the kind discussed above. Oil-price shocks have been associated
with at least three of the last five recessions. The appendix develops a simple
approach to estimating the business-cycle impact of an oil-price shock and
compares it with alternative estimates. A sharp oil-price increase is likely to
be followed by a spurt of inflation, a fall in consumer and business spending,
and tight money as the Federal Reserve contains the inflation. Assuming that
the cyclical impact lasts only two years, and that monetary and fiscal policy
close the gap between the no-shock and the oil-shock output after that time,
the net cyclical impact of the adverse price reaction is estimated to be $391
billion. This equals a gross cyclical impact of $492 billion less the $101 billion
already included in the full-employment calculation above. The gross cyclical
impact is consistent with Perry’s estimate, being approximately 1½ years of
Perry’s estimate of the GDP impact of the same oil-price scenario. This
number is close to the output lost from the recession triggered by the First
Persian Gulf War, which amounted to $490 billion over a two-year period.
The impact of the happy oil price scenario is likely to be small because
most of the macroeconomic impacts will come well into the future and are
likely to be anticipated. Using the same methodology as is employed for the
oil-shock case, the impact is estimated to be $17 billion in net cyclical gain in
the first two years.

37

Summary of Economic Costs
We can now collect the different components of the cost of a war with
Iraq. It should be emphasized that these estimates vary in terms of precision
and empirical support. Indeed, aside from the estimates of the direct military
costs, all of the numbers should be regarded as informed conjecture. The
costs are limited to the United States and exclude other countries.
Moreover, these costs do not attempt to estimate the benefits of
resorting to arms. Since reducing future dangers from of the current Iraqi
regime are one of the major objectives of the war, we cannot truly balance the
costs and benefits of war without considering the benefits of the
disarmament of Iraq. The point was clearly put by Secretary Powell when he
asked, “But do we want Saddam Hussein to have nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons that he can use, as he has used these kinds of weapons in
the past against his neighbors, against his own people, or perhaps against us
someday? This is the time to stop him.”53 We do not (and cannot) measure
the extent to which military action today may reduce the threat of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction in the future. At the same time, we do not and
cannot estimate the increase or decrease in risk of terrorist acts that are
triggered or prevented by a war, or that are triggered or prevented when the
U.S. attention is focused on Iraq.
Table 7 shows a summary compilation of the different elements that
we have been able to quantify. Recall that these costs include only the costs to
the United States over the decade following the beginning of a war. The
favorable case indicates that the economic costs over the 2003-2012 period are
$99 billion dollars.54 This outcome assumes that the military, diplomatic, and
nation-building campaigns are successful.

Interview on the Oprah Winfrey Show, October 22, 2002, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/14563.htm.
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The spurious precision of the estimates should be ignored. Numbers are retained to the
nearest billion dollars to maintain numerical consistency. Any single number, and
therefore the total, is likely to be accurate only within a range of plus or minus fifty
percent.
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.
Costs of War (billions of 2002 $)

Source of Cost

Low (short and
favorable)

High
(protracted and
unfavorable)

$50

$140

[1]

75
30
1
-40
-17

500
105
10
778
391

[2]
[3]

$99

$1,924

Direct military spending

Notes

Follow-on costs
Occupation and peacekeeping
Reconstruction and nation-building
Humanitarian assistance
Impact on oil markets
Macroeconomic impact

Total

[4]
[5]

Table 7. Estimates of Decadal Cost to the United States of A Potential War
in Iraq (in billions of 2002 dollars)
These costs are the total for the decade following the conflict (e.g., 2003-2012).
Negative numbers are benefits.
Notes:
[1] Protracted conflict assumes that the monthly cost is 50 percent greater than
the CBO estimate and that the conflict lasts 8 months longer.
[2] The low and high numbers assume, respectively, peacekeeper costs of
$200,000 to $250,000 per peacekeeper per year, with the numbers from 75,000 to
200,000, and for periods of 5 to 10 years.
[3] This includes, at the low end, reconstruction costs of $30 billion and minimal
nation-building costs. At the high end, it adds a “Marshall Plan for Iraq” as
described in the text.
[4] These estimates refer to a full-employment economy. The high estimate is
based on Perry’s “worse” or middle case, which assumes a production decline of
7 mbpd offset by withdrawals from reserves of 2½ mbpd. The “happy” case
assumes that OPEC increases production by 2/3 mbpd in the five years after the
end of hostilities and that production stays at the higher level. The sign is
negative to indicate a benefit or negative cost.
[5] The macroeconomic impact excludes the full-employment impacts in [4] and
includes only the first two years of a cyclical impact.
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The high case is a collage of potential unfavorable outcomes rather
than a single scenario. It shows the array of costs that might be incurred if the
war drags on, occupation is lengthy, nation building is costly, the war
destroys a large part of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, there is lingering military
and political resistance in the Islamic world to U.S. occupation, and there are
major adverse psychological reactions to the conflict. The outer limit of costs
would be around $1.9 trillion, most of which come outside of the direct
military costs.
Be warned that this discussion vastly oversimplifies the analysis by
constructing only two cases, whereas reality presents a dizzying array of
outcomes. Returning to the metaphor of war as a giant roll of the dice, we
might say that the U.S. could end up paying the low costs of around $100
billion if the dice come up favorably. If some dice come up unfavorably, the
costs would lie between the low and the high cases. However, if the U.S. has
a string of bad luck or misjudgments during or after the war, the outcome
could reach the $1.9 trillion of the high case.
Even the high case is not the limit of fortune’s frowns. This number
excludes any costs to other countries and consequent further impact on the
U.S., omits the most extreme outcomes (such as chemical or biological
warfare), and excludes Perry’s “worst” case in oil markets. Moreover, the
quantified costs ignore any tangible or intangible fallout that comes from
worldwide reaction (except that of a potential boycott by oil producers)
against perceived American disregard for the lives and property of others.
One feature not shown in Table 7 is the extent to which other countries
share the costs. In the first Persian Gulf War, the U.S. diplomatic efforts
reduced the military expenditures for the war essentially to zero. It seems
highly unlikely that the U.S. can transfer most of the military costs to other
countries in the present circumstance, and help from U.S. allies is even more
unlikely if the U.S. undertakes a unilateral war without broad international
support. Indeed, the longer, more expensive, bloodier, more unilateral, and
more destructive is the war, the larger the fraction of the very large costs the
U.S. will be forced to bear.
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Why Do Nations Underestimate the Costs of War?
The historical record is littered with failed forecasts about the
economic, political, and military outcomes of wars. Why do forecasts often
fall so far astray?
To begin with, the outbreak of war is itself evidence of some kind of
faulty bargaining process, major miscalculation, or impaired collective
decision-making on a grand scale. Wars destroy in a few days or months the
physical and human capital that has been accumulated over decades or
centuries. With hindsight, would the ministers of George III have risked the
empire for the principle of levying a tax on tea? Would the southerners have
seceded and provoked a civil war if they had known the devastation that
would follow? Would the Germans have provoked World Wars I and II?
Would Japan have bombed Pearl Harbor? Would the United States have sent
half a million men in Vietnam? Economics teaches that trade is a positivesum game that helps all who participate. By contrast, war is the ultimate
negative-sum game in which the spoils of the victors are much less than the
losses of the vanquished.
Additionally, wars are disproportionately undertaken by nations who
overestimate their chances of victory or underestimate the size of the
undertaking. They are often started or provoked by those – like Saddam
Hussein – who miscalculate badly and often. Perhaps, as in imperial Austria,
war is chosen by those who cannot count, refuse to count, count badly, or
belittle costs. Sometimes, as with Lyndon Johnson, leaders pursue war
because they are foolishly sucked into a psychology where honor and
credibility are valued above the lives of combatants and the livelihoods of
citizens – and both credibility and the economy end up as casualties.
Often, nations underestimate combat’s costs because they are unable to
listen or are provided systematically biased information. Some leaders either
cannot hear bad news or kill the messenger who delivers it. Philip II of Spain
was of the first variety, as Barbara Tuchman recounts in her masterful history
of catastrophically bad decisions:
Wooden-headedness, the source of self-deception, is a factor that plays a
remarkably large role in government. It consists in assessing a situation in terms of
preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary signs. It is
acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts. It is
epitomized in a historian’s statement about Philip II of Spain, the surpassing
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wooden-head of all sovereigns: “No experience of the failure of his policy could
shake his belief in its essential excellence.”55

There are many examples of the dangers of sealing off a leader from
information in such a way that produces poor decisions. Saddam Hussein
has an unbroken record of catastrophic miscalculations since his rise to
power in 1979. His reign has comprised eight years of disastrous war with
Iran, one year of war with the United States, eleven years of draconian
sanctions, and only three years free of costly disputes or hostilities. Time and
again, Saddam ignored intelligence, his advisers, even CNN, and relied upon
his own bizarre theories. An example from Kenneth Pollack is instructive:
What is most disconcerting about Saddam’s decision to attack Kuwait [in
1990] is that he apparently had concluded that there was a high probability that the
United States would oppose an invasion of Kuwait militarily and he believed that he
could defeat the expected American response…. Although all indications are that the
Iraqi elite feared that the U.S.-led coalition would obliterate the Iraqi armed forces,
Saddam convinced himself otherwise…. According to General Samarra’i , Saddam
was dismissive of American military capabilities: “…. He would say that, ‘We will
fire mud and water to the screen of these radars that are leading these cruise
missiles.’ ” 56

Might historians look back and conclude that the United States also
showed signs of wooden-headedness in its determination to overthrow
Saddam in Iraq? In contrast to the clear danger from terrorist activities,
there is no imminent threat from Iraq. A war in Iraq threatens to claim the
scarce resources and attention of the United States for many years. A
stagnant economy, fiscal deficits, a persistent crisis of corporate
governance, growing health-care problems, and trouble spots in the rest of
the world – all these would take a back seat if the U.S. gets bogged down in
issues of war and peace in Iraq.
A further reason for underestimating the costs of war, particularly
salient for democracies like the United States, is the advantage of
understating costs for gaining political consensus. If wars are thought to be
short, cheap, and bloodless, then it is easier to persuade the populace and the
Congress to defer to the President. If the American people are led to believe
that a war with Iraq will be like the First Persian Gulf War, or like the
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Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, Knopf, New York, 1984, p.

7.
Kenneth J. Pollack, The Gathering Storm: The Case For Invading Iraq, Random House,
New York, 2002, pp. 261, 262 (emphasis in the original).
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Afghanistan conflict, then they may believe that war will not disrupt life or
comforts and the world will be rid of a terrible tyrant. Moreover, if optimistic
forecasts prove wrong, it is much easier to raise the extra billions of dollars
once troops are in the field and bullets are flying than before the battle is
engaged. Politics does not end at the water’s edge, but it is surely silenced
when the first shot is fired.
All the dangers that lead to ignoring or underestimating the costs of
war can be reduced by a thoughtful public discussion. Yet neither the Bush
administration nor the Congress – neither the proponents nor the critics of
war – has presented a serious estimate of the costs of a war in Iraq. Neither
citizens nor policy makers are able to make informed judgments about the
realistic costs and benefits of a potential conflict when none is given.
Particularly worrisome are the casual promises of post-war
democratization, reconstruction, and nation building in Iraq. The cost of war
may be turn out to be low, but the cost of a successful peace looks very steep.
If American taxpayers decline to pay the bills for ensuring the long-term
health of Iraq, America would leave behind mountains of rubble and mobs of
angry people. As the world learned from the Carthaginian peace that settled
World War I, the cost of a botched peace may be even higher than the price of
a bloody war.
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Technical Appendix:
The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq

The most durable economic impacts of a war in Iraq are likely to be the
effects on oil markets. Economic models of the oil market are extremely
complex because they combine hard geological realities with game-theoretic
indeterminacies of oligopolistic behavior, and these difficulties are overlaid
with domestic politics and geopolitical strategies in all major countries. The
inherent complexities become even greater given uncertainties about postwar oil-market destruction and production scenarios, changes in
decisionmakers in the Gulf region, and the potential instability of the OPEC
cartel. Finally, from a pure economic point of view, there are technical
difficulties in modeling the response of oil demand to price shocks.
The impact of oil prices on economic activity has been well established
since the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. Economists do not always agree,
however, on the exact mechanism by which oil prices affect the economy. The
two major routes are the real-income effect and the business-cycle impact.
The real-income effect measures the impact of changing oil prices at full
employment on expenditures for imported oil and on productivity as
businesses substitute other inputs for high-priced oil. The business cycle
effect occurs when higher oil prices trigger lower spending and higher
unemployment, either directly through the impact on real incomes and
consumption or indirectly through monetary tightening, higher interest rates,
and lower investment. These two mechanisms are discussed in turn.
Full employment impacts on real incomes
To tackle the impact on real incomes in a full-employment economy, I
have drawn upon recent general-equilibrium economic models of oil demand
along with the scenarios laid out by oil-market specialists. This appendix lays
out the results of the oil modeling exercise. The model assumes that output is
a single homogeneous good. The major component of the model is a
production function in which output is produced by other factors and oil
inputs, where oil is supplied both by endogenous imports and exogenous
domestic production. Aggregate output is produced by a putty-clay
technology in oil and other exogenous inputs and is characterized by CobbDouglas substitutability ex ante and fixed proportions between output and oil
inputs ex post. The model is a full-employment model that calculates the
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terms of trade effects along with the effects of substitution of other inputs for
oil. The investment-output ratio is assumed to be invariant over time.
The parameters central to the model’s performance are the following:
the initial level and the growth rate of total factor productivity, the elasticity
and the rate of growth of the elasticity of output with respect to oil inputs,
and the depreciation rate. Note that the depreciation rate is key because it
determines the speed with which oil demand responds to changes in oil
prices. It is assumed that capital is never scrapped, which is realistic when oil
inputs are a very small share (around 3 percent) of costs. More precisely, the
equations of the model are the following:
(1)

Q(t,t) = A(t) E(t, t)b(t)

(2)

Q(t) = Q(t,t) + (1- d) Q(t-1)

(3)

E(t) = DP(t) + OI(t)

(4)

E(t) = E(t, t) + (1- d) E(t-1)

where Q(t,t) is the output produced in year t from vintage t, A(t) is total
factor productivity in year t, E(t, t) is oil inputs used in year t in vintage t, b(t)
is the time-varying ex ante elasticity of output with respect to oil inputs in
year t, Q(t) is total output, E(t) is total oil inputs, d is the depreciation rate of
capital, DP(t) is domestic production of oil, and OI(t) is imports of oil. It is
assumed that A(t) and b(t) have constant proportional rates of change over
time. The major other variable is P(t), which is the real price of oil, assumed
to be set in world markets. The model assumes that, for a given vintage,
output, energy inputs, and other inputs decline exponentially at rate d after
the initial year.
By manipulating these four equations, we obtain the following two
equations for estimation:
(5)

E(t) = (1 - d) E(t-1) + [P(t)/(b(t) A(t)](1/(b(t)-1))

(6)

Q(t) = (1 – d) Q(t-1) + A(t) [P(t)/(b(t) A(t)](b(t)/(b(t)-1))

The model’s five parameters are determined by weighted least squares
for the sample period 1970-2002 using annual data; data for 2002 are
preliminary through the first nine months of the year. The important
depreciation rate variable (d) has an estimated value of 12.2 percent per year
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with a standard error of 5.3 percent per year. These results are consistent
with recent studies of the oil market.57 Figure A-1 shows the value of oil
imports (in 2002 prices) for the estimated model along with the actual
numbers over the 1970-2002 period. Figure A-2 shows the actual and
calculated volume of oil imports. The model captures the broad trends but
cannot resolve the short-run turning points precisely. The results presented
below are, however, quite robust to changes in structure or timing.
Using the model, we estimate the impact of both Perry’s “worse” case
as well as the “happy” case of an increase in oil production. To estimate the
impacts of alternative outcomes, the trend case assumes that real oil prices
grow at 2 percent per year after 2002. The “worse” or price-shock case starts
with an initial price of $75 per barrel in 2003. Based on the behavior of oil
prices in the 1970-2000 period, oil prices in the worse case are assumed to
regress back to the trend path at a rate of 20 percent per year of the difference
between the trend and worse prices in the prior year.
The “happy” outcome is somewhat more complex to model. It assumes
that the net increase in OPEC production (due to an increase in productive
capacity in Iraq less any reduction in production in Saudi Arabia and other
supplier countries) totals 2/3 million barrels per day, which is attained five
years after the beginning of a war. It further assumes that world oil demand
is four times as large as U.S. demand and has equal elasticities. The model
then solves for the price trajectory that balances supply and demand over the
2003-2012 period.
The key results of the model are shown in Table A-1. The first column
shows the terms of trade impacts – that is, the impacts of the shocks on the
*real cost of oil imports. The second column shows the impact on real net
domestic product (which is the appropriate welfare measure of output). The
final column shows real national income, which is real output corrected for
the terms of trade effect. The third column equals the sum of the first two.

See James D. Hamilton, “What is an Oil Shock?” NBER Working Papers 7755, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2000. The results are similar to the putty-clay model
developed in Andrew Atkeson and Patrick J. Kehoe, “Models of Energy Use: Putty-Clay
Versus Clay-Clay,” American Economic Review, September 1999, pp. 1028-043.
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Case

Real
Real
Value of Oil Potential
National
Imports
Output
Income
Costs, billions, 2002 prices

Oil Price Shock
First year impact
Impact of years 2 - 9
Total impact

148
-34
114

-27
-637
-665

-175
-603
-778

Production Increase
First year impact
Impact of years 2 - 9
Total impact

-3
3
0

1
38
40

5
35
40

Table A-1. Cost Estimates of Adverse and Happy Outcomes in Oil Markets
Note: These estimates are for the full-employment model described in text.
_________________________________________________________________
The cost in the adverse case totals slightly under $800 billion for the
decade. About one-seventh of this is higher expenditures on imported oil,
while the balance comes from a decline in real output. The increase in oil
expenditures comes in the early years, before the economy has a chance to
adapt to the higher prices. Most of the production decline, by contrast, comes
in later periods as the economy substitutes other inputs for higher-cost oil.
Note that these results exclude any business cycle impacts, which are
considered next, and additionally they assume perfect competition, no
economic frictions, and no political sand in the gears of market reactions.
Business cycle impacts
Sharp oil price increases have been associated with most of the
recessions of the last three decades. There have been numerous studies of the
impact of oil prices on output in the short run. We can use a simple oneequation model to capture the fundamental dynamics. An instrumentalvariables estimate over the period 1962 to 2002 relating real GDP to real oil
prices, lagged real GDP, and a trend produces the following:
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(7) log[Q(t)] = constant - 0.011 log[P(t)] - 0.023 log[P(t-1)] + 0.22 log[Q(t-1)]
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.214)
+ trend + autoregressive error correction
SEE = 0.0172

R2 = 0.998

The variable definitions are the same as in the previous section. In this
equation, I have used twice-lagged real oil prices as the instrument for lagged
real GDP. The numbers in parentheses underneath the coefficients are the
standard errors of the coefficients, SEE is the standard error of estimate of the
equation, and R2 is the fraction of the variance of the dependent variable
explained by the equation.
We can use this equation to project the impact of the oil-price shock on
output. The equation predicts for the worse price case a decline in real GDP
reaching a maximum of 3.5 percent of GDP, which is much larger than
maximum decline of 0.5 percent predicted by the full-employment model in
the last section. The reason why output reacts so much to oil price increases –
almost 10 times more than would be predicted by standard neoclassical
growth models – has been observed in earlier research and remains
controversial. One possible reason for the large discrepancy is that oil price
increases tend to fuel inflationary pressures and thereby trigger antiinflationary monetary policies. Inflationary impulses also tend to redistribute
income from labor to property incomes and thereby lower consumption
expenditures.
We can use equation (7) to estimate the impact of the “worse” oil-price
shock on the business cycle. For this purpose, I assume that the businesscycle impacts last only two years, and that monetary and fiscal policies close
the gap between the trend and worse output paths after that time. I also
subtract the full-employment impact on output estimated in the first section
to prevent double counting.
Under these assumptions, the net cyclical impact of the worse price
increase is $391 billion. This net number represents $492 billion of gross loss
in output less $101 billion of loss in potential output which was counted in
the numbers in Table A-1. The gross loss estimate is consistent with Perry’s
estimate, being approximately 1½ years of Perry’s estimate of the GDP
impact of the worse oil price scenario. Additionally, this estimate is close to
the loss in output from the recession triggered by the First Persian Gulf War,
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which reduced output over the 1990:3 to 1992:2 period by $490 billion relative
to the pre-war trend.
The impact of the happy oil price scenario is likely to be very small.
Most of the macroeconomic impacts will come well into the future and are
likely to be anticipated. Using the same methodology as is employed for the
oil-shock case, the impact is estimated to be $17 billion in net cyclical gain in
the first two years.
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Figure A-1. Estimated and Actual Value of Oil Imports, 1970-2002 (billions
in constant prices)
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Figure A-2. Actual and Projected Volume of Imports, 1970-2002 (billions of
barrels)
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